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I. INTRODUCTION
Minnesota recognizes the necessity of balancing the duty of
law enforcement officials to effectively protect the public and the
peoples' constitutional right to be free from unlawful government
intrusion.! For almost a century the courts have used the judicially
imposed exclusionary rule to deter the police from violating an in-
dividual's Fourth Amendment guarantee against an illegal search
2 3
and seizure by the police. In State v. Britton, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court had the opportunity to decide exactly how far the ex-
clusionary rule should be extended, and in doing so, it overturned
the trial court's decision to admit the evidence.4
Part II will begin by providing an analysis of Britton's holding
and then offer a critique of the Minnesota Supreme Court's deci-
sion by first discussing how it misstated what Terry v. Ohio requires
of law officers in the field, and then considering how the court ig-
nored stare decisis by ruling in the way that it did. The author will
conclude Part II by arguing that when Terry is considered from a
historical context, it becomes apparent that its holding is not nearly
as workable in today's society as it was when the United States Su-
preme Court handed down the decision over three decades ago.
Part III is dedicated to a discussion of the evolution of the
suppression doctrine and the various tenets on which the United
States Supreme Court relied to justify its exclusion of wholly reli-
able and trustworthy evidence gathered in violation of an individ-
ual's Fourth Amendment rights. Part IV will then consider how
this wholesale suppression of probative evidence not only has failed
in its purported purpose as a deterrent of constitutional violations
1. State v. Fish, 280 Minn. 163, 166-67, 159 N.W.2d 786, 789 (1968) (noting
that although subject to certain enumerated exceptions, an arrest may not be
made without a warrant, law enforcement officials, nevertheless, have a duty to
protect the public safety by utilizing their faculties of observation and acting ac-
cordingly when they come upon suspicious individuals).
2. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-93 (1914) (holding that in a
federal prosecution the Fourth Amendment bars the use of evidence obtained
through an illegal search and seizure).
3. 604 N.W.2d 84 (Minn. 2000).
4. Id. at 89 (holding that the evidence obtained as a result of the stop was
inadmissible because there was no evidence in the record to support the State's
contention that the police stop was based on reasonable and articulable suspicion
of ongoing criminal activity).
5. 392U.S. 1 (1968).
1896 [Vol. 27:3
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by the police, but also has had a seriously detrimental effect on
both the officers we entrust to protect us and society in general.
Britton was a product of a deeply divided Minnesota Supreme
Court that was split 4-3. Close call cases like Britton exemplify the
fact that a rule that commands the wholesale exclusion of trustwor-
thy and reliable evidence is at worst a failure and at best a mistake.
The Britton Court suppressed the evidence gathered by the arrest-
ing officers not because it in any way lacked veracity, but solely be-
cause of the exclusionary rule. Because the present remedy is un-
acceptable and clearly not a solution to the problem, there is
simply no logical reason why the law-abiding members of society
should be forced to endure it any longer. Other remedies exist
that are far superior to allowing a guilty individual to escape justice.
Part V will explore a completely alternative remedy that will guar-
antee our Fourth Amendment rights and protect society from those
criminals who have committed wrongs against it. In other words,
the alternative solution set forward in this article will serve all of the
various needs that exist without forcing the courts to continue us-
ing a bright-line rule that clearly is ineffective in fulfilling its pur-
ported purpose.
II. STATE V. BR17TON AND THE TERRY DOCTRINE
A. The Facts
At approximately 11:00 p.m. on March 3, 1998, Launair
Gerard Britton was driving a friend's automobile, which had a bro-
ken side window covered over with a plastic bag. Suspecting that
the vehicle may have been stolen, two Minneapolis police officers
who were on routine patrol in North Minneapolis began to follow
it. 7 While doing so, they learned through a computer check that
8the car was not listed as being stolen. The officers continued to
follow the defendant for approximately four blocks, and although
they noticed no unusual or illegal driving conduct, they neverthe-
less believed the vehicle to be "suspicious" and stopped it.9
The officers approached the vehicle and noticed that, in addi-
tion to Britton, there were two passengers, one of them being a
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twelve-year-old child. ° While questioning the driver, the officers
observed signs of intoxication and arrested him.1' A blood alcohol
test was duly administered ultimately confirming the officers' suspi-
cions that the suspect had a blood alcohol content that exceeded
the legal limit.
12
Two days later, Britton was charged in Hennepin County Dis-
trict Court with various driving offenses, including an aggravated
driving violation and driving with an alcohol concentration over
.20, which is child endangerment. 13 The defendant filed a motion
to suppress any evidence obtained from the traffic stop, claiming
the stop violated both the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitu-
tion. 4
One of the officers testified that, in his experience, the broken
side window was an indication that the vehicle may have been sto-
len because breaking windows is "a common practice for stealing
vehicles." 5 The officer further testified that he had been involved
in the investigation and recovery of ten to twenty stolen automo-
biles with broken windows. 16 He noted that the negative computer
check in no way dispelled either his or his partner's suspicion that
the vehicle was in fact not stolen. 17 The officer explained to the
court that such checks are not always determinative because vehi-
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. It is unlawful for a person to drive, operate, or be in physical control
of a motor vehicle when his blood alcohol concentration meets or exceeds .10.
MINN. STAT. § 169.121, subd. 1(d) (1996).
13. Britton, 604 N.W.2d at 86. A person determined to be driving under the
influence of alcohol under section 169.121, subd. 1, or who refuses to submit to
testing as per subd. 1 (a), and who has a child in the vehicle who is less than six-
teen years of age is guilty of a gross misdemeanor if that child is more than thirty-
six months younger than the violator. MINN. STAT. § 169.121, subd. 3(c)(4)
(1996).
14. Britton, 604 N.W.2d at 86. The Minnesota Constitution provides that:
[t)he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be vio-
lated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the person or things to be seized.
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10. The Minnesota Constitution is identical to the
United States Constitution's Fourth Amendment search and seizure provi-
sion. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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cles are often stolen in the nighttime hours leading to delays in dis-
covery and ultimate reporting of the thefts.
18
Based on this testimony, the district court upheld the stop,
finding that it was based on something "more than whim or ca-
price," and therefore proper under the United States and Minne-
sota Constitutions.' 9 As a result, the district court ruled that the
evidence obtained during the stop was admissible. ° Britton waived
his right to a jury trial and, based on the stipulated facts, the court
found Britton guilty of driving with an alcohol concentration of
more than .20-child endangerment, an enhanced gross misde-
21meanor.
Britton appealed the trial court's decision to the Minnesota22
Court of Appeals. In an unpublished decision, the appellate court
23affirmed the lower court's holding. Writing for a split court,
Judge Toussaint noted that "the MDT [Minnesota Department of
Transportation] check did not conclusively dispel Officer Taylor's
suspicion that the car was 'recently stolen' and had not yet been
reported. Furthermore, Taylor's training and experience provided
a reasonable basis for his suspicion. Therefore, Britton's Fourth
Amendment rights were not violated."24 Britton appealed the cir-
cuit court's decision to the Minnesota Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari to review the question of reasonable suspicion de
25novo.
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court's Analysis
The Minnesota Supreme Court, citing Terry, United States v.
Sokolow, and State v. George, concluded that the trial court erred in
admitting the evidence and reversed, finding no evidence in the
record sufficient to conclude that the investigative stop was based
on a reasonable and articulable suspicion of ongoing criminal activ-
ity.26 The court defined the limited investigatory stop made by Of-
18. Id.




23. State v. Britton, No. C9-98-968, 1999 WL 43322, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App.
Feb. 2, 1999).
24. Id.
25. Britton, 604 N.W.2d at 86.
26. Id. at 87-89 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968), United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989), and State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn.
2001] 1899
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ficer Taylor and his partner as a Terry stop2 7 and reasoned that,
since the state "did not show an objectively reasonable articulable
suspicion on the part of the officer before the computer check,"
the evidence gathered from the stop should never have been ad-S 28
mitted. The supreme court relied on Terry when it said that there
was no objective evidence in the record to justify the stop, and the
subjective good faith of law enforcement officials, without more, is
29not sufficient to justify a search and seizure.
C. The Minnesota Supreme Court Misstates Terry's Requirements
The Minnesota Supreme Court erred in reversing the deci-
sions of the trial and appellate courts. Less than three years prior
to Britton, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated in dicta that the
burden law enforcement officers must overcome to justify a traffic50
stop is not a heavy one. The court has also instructed that the po-
lice must be afforded the opportunity to inquire in order to safe-. 51
guard the community. As long as the stop is not based on mere
whim, caprice, or idle curiosity, but is instead based on reasonable
inferences drawn by an experienced police officer, it will be
1997) as the basis for the conclusion that investigative stops by law enforcement
officers must be based on articulable facts which give rise to an objective manifes-
tation that the individual stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activ-
ity).
27. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, Officer McFadden
observed Terry and his cohorts, repeatedly and for an extended amount of time,
performing reconnaissance on a store by means of casually gazing through its
window. Id. at 6. Suspecting that the three men were carrying guns and planning
to burglarize the establishment, McFadden felt it would be appropriate to take di-
rect action against them. Id. He approached them, identified himself as a police
officer, and asked for their names. Id. at 6-7. He then grabbed Terry, patted him
down from outside his clothing and felt a pistol. Id. at 7. Only after he felt the
gun did Officer McFadden remove Terry's overcoat, pulling from one of the
pockets a .38 caliber revolver. Id. After balancing society's interest in having ef-
fective law enforcement with an individual's constitutional right to be free from
illegal searches and seizures by the government, the Court held that the police
may conduct limited stops to investigate suspected criminal activity when the po-
lice can "point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id. at 20-21.
28. Britton, 604 N.W.2d at 88.
29. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968), which in turn quotes
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)).
30. State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997). In most circum-
stances, "if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, the
officer has an objective basis for stopping the vehicle." Id.
31. State v. Dezso, 512 N.W.2d 877, 880 (Minn. 1994) (quoting Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224-25 (1973)).
1900 [Vol. 27:3
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deemed constitutional 2
Britton is not a case of idle curiosity by an inexperienced law
enforcement official, and the court was incorrect when it con-
cluded that the officers, when considering the broken window,
34failed to make an assessment based on training and experience.
Officer Taylor testified to his training and experience when he
stated that he had been involved in the recovery of ten to twenty
stolen cars with broken windows.3 5 All that was initially required
was that the officers have sufficient reason to stop Britton, not
probable cause for arrest.36 The police were well within their rights
and, in fact, had a duty to stop the vehicle and inquire as to the
driver's identity and actions.37 In United States v. Cortez,3 8 Chief Jus-
tice Burger emphasized that in determining whether there was a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the defendant, "a
trained officer [may] draw[] inferences and make[] deductions...
that may well elude an untrained person."39 Officer Taylor and his
partner stopped Britton based on their knowledge and experience
that such vehicles are quite often stolen. 4° Although the majority in
Britton claimed to be "deferential to police training and experience
and recognize that a trained officer can properly act on suspicion
that would elude an untrained eye," 41 this was apparently little more
42than lip service paid by the court.
The court held that since the stop lacked any objective mani-
festation that Britton was engaged in criminal activity, the stop was
illegal according to State v. George.43 However, the court was incor-
32. State v. Barber, 308 Minn. 204, 206, 241 N.W.2d 476, 477 (1976) (quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21(1968)).
33. Britton, 604 N.W.2d at 86-87.
34. Id. at 88.
35. Id. at 86.
36. State v. Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 308, 309 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 310.
38. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
39. Id. at 418. Chief Justice Burger concluded that "the evidence thus col-
lected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as
understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement." Id.
40. Britton, 604 N.W.2d at 86.
41. Id. at 88-89.
42. Id. at 90 (Gilbert, J., dissenting) (citing State by Beaulieu v. City of
Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 569-70 (Minn. 1994), which recognized the court's
deference to police officer experience and the officer's discretion to act on that
experience).
43. Id. at 87-88.
20011 1901
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rect in applying this standard. In State v. Mason," the Minnesota
Supreme Court concluded that "if a valid basis for the police intru-
sion existed, a basis which the district court and this court can as-
sess, it does not matter if the officer could not articulate a specific
criminal activity., 45 Suspicion is all that is required as long as the
officer can sufficiently articulate the factual basis for that suspi-
46cion. Therefore, "It]he ultimate determinative issue ... is not
whether the officer saw the violation but whether his 'belief (or
'suspicion' or 'assumption') that the violation occurred was rea-
sonably inferable from what he did see."4  Officer Taylor stated
that the basis for the stop was his belief that the broken window was
48an indication that the vehicle was stolen. Thus, the stop was based
on more than a mere "unarticulated hunch" as is required by
49United States v. Sokolow and its progeny. Police officers are profes-
sionals trained in the field of law enforcement, and like other pro-
fessionals, they have a keen sense of knowing when something is
wrong.5° Because these professionals rely on their expertise, they
are not always able to easily articulate into words what exactly is51
wrong. However, simply because a police officer may lack the
training or ability to clearly articulate the basis for his suspicion or
belief, this does not mean that the criteria he used lacked the ob-
jectivity commanded by George and Cortez.
52
44. No. C4-93-339, 1993 WL 430388 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 1993).
45. Id. at *2.
46. Berge v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 374 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Minn. 1985).
47. Id. at 733.
48. Britton, 604 N.W.2d at 86.
49. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); accord State v.Johnson, 257
N.W.2d 308, 309 (Minn. 1977).
50. Daniel Richman, The Process of Terry-Lawmaking, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
1043, 1050 (1998).
51. Id. Richman argues:
Moreover, having been selected according to a list of criteria on which
the ability to offer legal justifications may not rank very high, and lacking
access to the kind of comprehensive data bases [sic] that other profes-
sionals draw upon to educate and justify their intuitions, our police offi-
cer will often be particularly ill-equipped to articulate the factors inform-
ing his hunches.
Id.
52. State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997) (citing United States
v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). In Cortez, the Border Patrol used their
knowledge and expertise concerning the smuggling of illegal aliens. They acted
on such evidence as human footprints and vehicle types. Similarly, the officer in
Britton used his extensive knowledge and experience as a police officer versed in
the investigation of stolen vehicles. This can be evidenced in his testimony that
the majority of stolen vehicles that the police recover have broken side or wing
1902 [Vol. 27:3
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In dismissing Britton's second argument that even if the police
had reasonable suspicion to stop the car it was conclusively dis-
pelled once the computer check revealed that it was not listed as
stolen,53 the court accepted Officer Taylor's explanation of why the
check did not dispel his suspicion. 54 In other words, the court ac-
cepted as true his testimony concerning the delays inherent in the
discovery and reporting of vehicles stolen in the evening hours.55
The supreme court's willingness to accept this testimony, yet reject
the officer's testimony concerning the reasonable suspicion created
by the broken window, is both curious and wholly inconsistent.56 At
no point did the court offer an explanation for the distinction.
5 7
In addition, as Justice Gilbert expounded in his dissenting
opinion, "the majority simply overstates what reasonable, articu-
lable suspicion requires.,58 In its decision, the court offered nu-
merous legitimate explanations that the officers could have consid-
ered before stopping Britton. 59 However, Tery neither requires a
police officer to discount the gamut of possible lawful explanations
for the facts which create reasonable suspicions in his mind, nor
does it contemplate courts to make forays into the world of suppo-
sition and conjecture. 6° What Terry does command is that "the po-
lice officer ... be able to point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion."6' Officer Taylor did just thatS 62
when he testified to his concern over the broken window. In or-
windows. Therefore, his decision to investigate was based not on whim, caprice,
idle curiosity, or an unarticulated hunch. Instead, it was the result of significant
experience in the recovery of stolen vehicles based on an objectively reasonable
belief that Britton was driving such a vehicle. Furthermore, unlike the officer in
George whose observation of the defendant's vehicle's headlight configuration was
patently spurious, officer Taylor's belief was not incorrect. He clearly and cor-
rectly observed that the window was broken and covered over with plastic.
53. Britton, 604 N.W.2d at 87.
54. Id. at 88.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 90 (Gilbert, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 89.
58. Id. at 90.
59. Id. at 88. The court offered the following: 1) the contents of the vehicle
could have been stolen rather than the vehicle itself; 2) even if the vehicle had
been stolen, the victim rather than the perpetrator may have been driving it; and
3) the window could have been broken, not due to a crime, but because of an ac-
cident or, as the court supposed, an owner who locked his keys in the car. Id.
60. Id. at 90 (Gilbert, J., dissenting).
61. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
62. Britton, 604 N.W.2d at 86.
2001] 1903
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der for the stop to be legal, it was not necessary for him to be "abso-
lutely certain" that a crime had been committed, but only that it
was reasonable for him to conclude, in light of his experience, that
"criminal activity may be afoot. " 6' The court's misstatement of what
exactly Tery requires of police officers, combined with the fact that
it improperly discredited Officer Taylor's testimony, serves to cre-
ate confusion in the minds of law enforcement officials. Adding
to this consternation is the court's refusal to recognize Officer Tay-
lor's reliance on the broken window as an objective basis for rea-
sonable suspicion when in State v. Smith65 the Minnesota Court of
Appeals held that a broken side window is probable cause to search
a vehicle.66
D. The Minnesota Supreme Court Ignores Stare Decisis
Unfortunately, the Minnesota Supreme Court's failure to re-
spect its holding in State v. Barbe 7 only increases the uncertainty
among the police. In Barber, Officer William Henry of the Minne-
sota Highway Patrol observed Barber and his companion traveling
in a vehicle with license plates attached by bailing wire instead of
the bolts typically used on vehicles.69 With his suspicions aroused,
Officer Henry stopped the vehicle to investigate whether the plates
might have been unlawfully taken from another vehicle. 70 When
asked for his driver's license, the defendant produced a notice of
license revocation that had been issued by the state. 71 After verify-
ing the revocation over his radio, Officer Henry arrested Barber. 7
At the Rasmussen hearing, Officer Henx testified that he had no• 3
other reason for stopping the defendant. Therefore, the issue be-
came whether the officer was justified in stopping the defendant
based merely on his suspicions concerning the use of bailing wire
63. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 30.
64. Britton, 604 N.W.2d at 89 (Gilbert,J., dissenting).
65. No. C6-92-915, 1992 WL 383456 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 1992).
66. Id. at *1 (noting that a broken side window is a "common indicator that a
vehicle has been stolen").
67. 308 Minn. 204, 241 N.W.2d 476 (1976).
68. Britton, 604 N.W.2d at 89 (Gilbert, J., dissenting).
69. Barber, 308 Minn. at 204-05, 241 N.W.2d at 476.
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instead of bolts to affix the license plates.
4
In affirming the conviction and upholding the trial court's rul-
ing that the stop was legal, the court distinguished State v.
McKinley,75 which had been decided almost one year earlier. In
McKinley, the court held that single, nonsystematic stops for routine
driver's license checks required as justification some reasonable sus-
picion by police of a violation. 6 However, in arriving at this deci-
sion, the McKinley majority approvingly vuoted the New York Court• • ,'77 ,
of Appeals, which noted in People v. Ingle that "the factual basis re-
quired to support a stop for a 'routine traffic check' is minimal. An
actual violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law need not be detect-
able. For example, an automobile in a general state of dilapidation
might properly arouse suspicion of equipment violations."
7
The Barber majority concluded that, irrespective of the fact the
plates were attached in an apparently legal way, since Officer Henry
relied upon his experience as a police officer knowledgeable in the
methods of motor vehicle thievery, 79 his decision to stop the defen-
dant's vehicle was based on more than "mere whim, caprice, or idle
curiosity."80 In explaining its decision in Britton, the court stated
that "[e]vidence of tampering or unauthorized replacement of li-
cense plates ... can be suggestive of ongoing criminal activity in a
way that a broken window is not."'8 However, it is clear that the
court simply embarked on an attempt to create a distinction with-
out a difference, and Terry simply does not support such a read-
ing.
82
The fact of the matter is that Barber's facts relating to "objective
indicia and reasonable inferences" are not logically distinguishable
83from those of Britton. When Officer Taylor used his experience to
74. Id. at 205, 241 N.W.2d at 476-77.
75. 305 Minn. 297, 232 N.W.2d 906 (1975).
76. Id. at 303-04, 232 N.W.2d at 911.
77. 330 N.E.2d 39 (N.Y. 1975).
78. Id. at 44.
79. For example, the court explained, clean plates on a dirty car often sug-
gests that the plates do not belong to the vehicle. When motor vehicles are used
to perpetrate a crime, the wrongdoer will often use plates stolen off of other cars
to escape apprehension even if the plates are observed. By using wire rather than
bolts to secure the plates to the car, that criminal may be able to remove them
more quickly than he otherwise could have. Barber, 308 Minn. at 207, 241 N.W.2d
at 477.
80. Id.
81. State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 89 (Minn. 2000).
82. Id. at 90 (Gilbert, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 91.
20011 1905
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make the decision to stop a "suspicious vehicle" being driven dur-
ing the late-night hours with a broken window, his actions were
precisely the same as those of Officer Henry when he pulled Barber
over for driving a vehicle with license plates held on by bailing
wire.84
The Minnesota Supreme Court minimized the importance of
police training and experience when it made the determination of
whether or not Officer Taylor had a "reasonable" basis for stopping
Britton.85 In addition, by failing to take into consideration Officer
Taylor's heightened suspicion over thefts taking place during his
"dog-watch" (8:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m.), the court effectively ignored
its earlier ruling in State v. Lee 6 where it held as relevant to its prob-
able cause analysis the fact that the police knew that "tires are more
commonly taken from automobiles at night than during the day.",
8
Not only does the court turn stare decisis on its head by effectively
overruling Barber without explicitly stating so,"" it also ignores what
the United States Supreme Court, circuit courts, and other state
courts have long stated regarding the importance of taking officer
knowledge, training, and experience into account when consider-
ing reasonableness and probable cause.89 In addition, when Tery's
84. Id.
85. Id. at 90.
86. 302 Minn. 382, 225 N.W.2d 14 (1975). In Lee, Officer Joseph Guy
stopped defendant, Vernon Lee, and through the rear window observed two
mounted tires that were not the correct size for the defendant's vehicle. Although
Officer Guy questioned Lee at the scene, he did not arrest him. However, he did
seize the tires and rims which were later identified by the owner as the wheels that
had been stolen from his car earlier that night. Based on the owner's statement,
the defendant was arrested for felonious theft. The district court dismissed the
prosecution reasoning that the arrest was based on an illegal seizure by the police.
In reversing and upholding the seizure, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted as
relevant to Officer Guy's probable cause assessment the fact that he stopped Lee
and made his observations at 4:15 a.m., a time at which tires are more commonly
stolen from vehicles than during the day. Id. at 382-87, 225 N.W.2d at 15-17.
87. Id. at 385, 225 N.W.2d at 16. See also State v. Compton, 293 N.W.2d 372,
375 (Minn. 1980) (acknowledging that the officer was justified in concluding that
the items were stolen because "[s]tore burglaries usually occur at night"); Com-
monwealth v. Ellis, 335 A.2d 512, 515 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) (recognizing that al-
though "the Fourth Amendment [does not] lie[] dormant during the night hours,
... some activities that are commonplace during daytime ... hours give rise to sus-
picion during other times of the day").
88. Britton, 604 N.W.2d at 90 (Gilbert, J., dissenting).
89. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975) (noting that
"[i]n all situations the officer is entitled to assess the facts in light of his experi-
ence .... "); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 (1975) (explaining that the
police are entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the facts in light of their
1906 [Vol. 27:3
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holding is examined more closely, it becomes apparent that the
Court was quite deferential to the street officer's experience and
knowledge and prior experience); United States v. McCoy, 200 F.3d 582, 584 (8th
Cir. 2000) (recognizing law enforcement experience in holding that the "plain
smell" rule gave the officer probable cause to search the defendant's vehicle when
he noticed the odor of burnt marijuana); United States v. Bartelho, 71 F.3d 436,
441 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that the police were not required to take the defen-
dant's girlfriend's statement at face value, "especially given their domestic-abuse
training"); United States v. Janus Indus., 48 F.3d 1548, 1553 (10th Cir. 1995) (not-
ing that the United States Customs agent's four years of experience and specific
expertise with drug paraphernalia may be considered in the judge's calculus);
United States v. Mueller, 902 F.2d 336, 342 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that the offi-
cer's ten years of training and knowledge of those chemicals commonly used in
the manufacture of methamphetamine provided a sufficient basis for the magis-
trate to conclude that the officer could reasonably smell and recognize the pres-
ence of this illegal substance); United States v. Hoyos, 892 F.2d 1387, 1392 (9th
Cir. 1989) (explaining that "[t]he experience and expertise of the officers in-
volved in the investigation and arrest may be considered in determining probable
cause"); United States v. McClard, 333 F. Supp. 158, 164 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (point-
ing out that a magistrate has a right to give weight to a law enforcement officer's
presumed expertise); State v. Ceron, 573 N.W.2d 587, 593 (Iowa 1997) (holding
that the officer had probable cause to make a warrantless arrest for drug posses-
sion based partly on the fact that he had fifteen years of experience, six of which
took place in a drug investigation unit); Gonzales v. State, 648 S.W.2d 684, 687
(Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (expounding that "[a] police officer is authorized to rely
on his training and knowledge whether or not he gains it from personal experi-
ence in the field, formal training or on-thejob training via other, more experi-
enced officers"); State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986) (explaining that
recognition should be given to a police officer's experience and training "where
there are objective facts to justify the ultimate conclusion"); State v. Graham, 927
P.2d 227, 234 (Wash. 1996) (taking into account the fact that the two arresting of-
ficers had been involved in excess of 2,200 narcotics arrests between them); State
v. Secrist, 589 N.W.2d 387, 395 (Wis. 1999) (considering in its probable cause de-
termination the fact that the arresting officer was a trained veteran with twenty-
three years of experience). See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 525 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that "a law enforcement officer can rely on his
own experience in detection and prevention of crime"); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1980) (Powell,J., concurring) (instructing that
"[i]n applying a test of 'reasonableness,' courts need not ignore the considerable
expertise that law enforcement officials have gained from their special training
and experience"). Accord AM. LAW INST. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROC. §
120.1 cmt. 6 (1975).
[T]he decision to arrest may be based on all facts which to an experi-
enced and careful officer bear on the likelihood of guilt, and ... this de-
cision may be made in the light also of any expert knowledge which the
officer possesses .... [A] good patrol officer considers it his business to
develop so complete a familiarity with his "beat" that he is alerted by any-
thing suspicious or unusual. To the extent that the officer can articulate
the factors supporting his suspicions, he should be allowed to use them
in justifying an arrest.
20011 1907
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judgment. ° For example, Chief Justice Warren did not apparently
attach any importance to what kind of store Terry and his accom-
plices were casing.9' In fact, the Court made no mention whatso-
92ever as to what kind of store it was. Therefore, it could rightfully
be concluded that the Court clearly appreciated that a police offi-
cer could draw upon his experience and training to know that an
armed robbery could occur in any store with cash or valuables no
matter what type of business in which it may have been engaged.93
What is even more interesting is the majority's failure to address
the fact that the defendants had already walked away from the store
when Officer McFadden approached and started questioning
them. 4 The Court's refusal to concern itself with this issue further
demonstrated its deference to the knowledge and experience that
95law enforcement officials possess.
The Minnesota Supreme Court's misstatement of what articu-
lable, reasonable suspicion requires, combined with its refusal to
respect stare decisis, will have the undesired effect of making it
more difficult for law enforcement in the state to do its job. The
court's ruling will result in more challenges to the officers' heat-of-
the-moment decisions and an increased use of the exclusionary
rule. This, in turn, will force judicial officers, who are not experts
in matters of law enforcement, into the position of having to make
determinations of reasonableness with less than a full understand-
96ing of the facts. Judges and magistrates should not disregard the
testimony of police officers whose experience and training make
them experts in matters of law enforcement.97 To the contrary, the
courts must accept the benefit of law enforcement's knowledge and
expertise, while giving due regard for the fact that police officers
are simply not afforded the same luxury for relaxed reflection as
judges and magistrates enjoy in their judicial chambers far removed
98from the perils of the street.
90. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 911, 926-27 (1998).
91. Id. at 926.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 926-27.
95. Id. at 927.
96. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 3.2(c) (3d. ed. 1996).
97. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 1.1 (c) (3d. ed. 1996).
98. David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court
1908 [Vol. 27:3
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E. Terry's Historical Backdrop And The Need To Look Forward
Britton exemplifies how a court can effectively misinterpret the
holdings of Tery and its progeny and substitute its own ideas about
what is "reasonable" for that of a trained expert in the field, while
at the same time offering little in the way of direction or consis-
tency to those law enforcement officers entrusted to keep our
communities safe.99 Is a strict adherence to an outdated doctrine
really in the best interest of present day society? When one consid-
ers Terry's historical backdrop, one cannot help but question
whether there still exists a need to adhere to a rule that was devel-
oped by the Court over thirty years ago when both the political and
social climates of the United States were vastly different from how
they appear today.
The nineteen sixties was a tumultuous era in American his-
tory.'00 President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in 1963 and
only four and one-half years later both the great Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. and presidential candidate, Robert F. Kennedy, met the
same unfortunate fate.'01 Students protested the military conflict in
Indochina commonly referred to as the "Viet Nam War."10 2 Per-
haps most significantly, racial friction could be witnessed through-
out the country due in part to law enforcement's use of abusive
stop and frisk procedures against African Americans. 0 3 This misuse
of field interrogations resulted in the upheaval and destruction of
inner city neighborhoods that were so serious as to prompt Presi-
dent Lyndon B. Johnson to order an investigation by the Presi-
dent's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice. 10 4 On the other side, Richard M. Nixon attempted to bol-
ster his candidacy in the presidential campaign of 1968 by exploit-
ing the widespread fears of a breakdown of public order. °5 Refer-
ring largely to the United States Supreme Court's landmark
Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 975, 999
(1998).
99. See generally State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 89 (Gilbert, J., dissenting)
(expressing that the majority's holding creates "confusion" rather than giving
"clear direction" as to what standard governs police behavior in Terry-stops).
100. Harris, supra note 98, at 980.
101. Id. at 979-80.
102. Id. at 979.
103. Id. at 980-81.
104. Id. at 981.
105. Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for PenalJustice: The Warren Court and the
Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L. F. 518, 539 (1975).
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decisions of Escobedo v. Illinois'06 and Miranda v. Arizona,107 the Re-
publican candidate for president accused the Supreme Court of
giving the "green light" to the nation's "criminal elements. "  In a
6,000-word document entitled "Toward Freedom from Fear,"
Nixon's New York Office decried that it was the candidate's belief
that some of the "courts had gone too far in weakening the peace
forces as against the criminal forces."09 It was Nixon's belief that
the cumulative impact of Escobedo and Miranda was to "very nearly
rule out the confession as an effective and major tool in prosecu-
tion and law enforcement.""
0
The legislative branch also reacted strongly to the Warren
Court's recent decisions by passing the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 only ten days prior to the Teny deci-
sion." It was Congress' conclusion that due to the "high incidence
of crime in the United States," in order for society to be adequately
protected, "law enforcement efforts must be better coordinated, in-
tensified, and made more effective at all levels of government.""
2
Some of the Act's provisions were obviously retaliatory measures
waged by Congress against the Court."
3
106. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The Escobedo court held that:
where ... the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has
been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interro-
gations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect
has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer,
and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitu-
tional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied "The Assis-
tance of Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment ... and any evi-
dence thereby obtained will be deemed inadmissible.
Id. at 490-91.
107. 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) (holding that once the police give the suspect
his Miranda warnings prior to interrogation, if that individual indicates that he
wishes to exercise his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, interroga-
tion must immediately cease and any statements subsequently taken will not be
admissible).
108. Nixon Links Court to Rise in Crime, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1968, at 18.
109. Robert B. Semple, Jr., Nixon Decries 'Lawless Society' and Urges Limited Wire-
tapping, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1968, at 1.
110. Id.
111. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
82 Stat. (1968). The purpose of this act was "[t]o assist State and local govern-
ments in reducing the incidence of crime, to increase the effectiveness, fairness,
and coordination of law enforcement and criminal justice systems at all levels of
government, and for other purposes." Id.
112. Id.
113. Allen, supra note 105, at 539.
1910 [Vol. 27:3
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These events combined to create an atmosphere that com-
pelled the Court to balance the interests of the police and society
in law enforcement and crime prevention with the interests of the
people to be free from unwarranted government intrusion. n4 It is
clear that when the Chief Justice wrote the opinion of the Court in
1968, he and the other justices were concerned about controlling
abusive police practices on the street.!5
The Terry holding was based during a time of significant tur-
moil, social unrest, and change in American history, and the cur-
rent situation in the twenty-first century no longer resembles that of
the late nineteen sixties. As a result, the facts on which Terry was
premised have so dramatically changed over the past thirty-three
years as to render its holding far less workable in today's society.
The ever-increasing level of crime and violence prevalent in mod-
ern-day America continues to take an adverse toll on our personal
security. At the same time, although it is certainly true that consti-
tutional violations by law enforcement continue to occur, this can-
not be compared to the abusive atmosphere of some three decades
ago. Furthermore, because a removal of the Terry doctrine would
not lead to an instability in American society, it is not necessary that
the courts continue to adhere to it. There are viable alternatives
that can deter Fourth Amendment violations by the police without
setting criminals free by excluding reliable and trustworthy evi-
dence.1 6 As with any doctrine that has outlasted its purpose and no
longer properly serves the legal and societal functions it was in-
tended to, we must look beyond Terry and the continued use of the
troubled exclusionary rule.
III. THE EMBARRASSED EVOLUTION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. The Supreme Court's Early Use Of The Fifth Amendment To Exclude
Evidence
Since the late nineteenth century, the United States Supreme
Court has created a variety of rationales for the judicially imposed
exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence. The Court began the
114. Harris, supra note 98, at 981. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968)
(stating that a police officer's search for weapons is an "intrusion" that must be
limited to only what is necessary).
115. John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Frisk Cases: A Look Inside the Supreme
Court's Conference, 72 ST.JOHN's L. REv. 749, 839 (1998).
116. Infra Part V.
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evolution of the suppression doctrine by linking the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments. Approximately twenty-eight years later, the
Court started using the Fourth Amendment as a sole basis for the
suppression of reliable evidence. Finally, through time, the Court
has developed additional justifications for the exclusionary rule.
The exclusionary rule can correctly be characterized as a dis-
torted and awkward attempt by the Court to provide a remedy for
misconduct by law enforcement." 7 The practice of excluding
wholly reliable evidence" s obtained in such a way that offends at
least five justices of the Supreme Court finds its roots two centuries
past in the landmark case of Boyd v. United States."9 The Boyd court
ruled that "the fourth and fifth amendments run almost into each
other" and are intimately related. The Court reasoned that law
enforcement employed unreasonable searches and seizures in an
effort to compel criminal suspects to offer incriminating evidence
against themselves. Therefore, since the former was condemned by
the Fourth Amendment and the latter prohibited by the Fifth, the
two amendments must necessarily be linked to one another. 2' In
the Court's words, "compelling a man in a criminal case to be a
witness against himself ... throws light on the question as to what is




Boyd's facts concerned a search and seizure involving the gov-
emnment's use of subpoenas.123 Subsequent to Boyd, throughout
what is commonly known as the "Lochner era,"12 4 the Court handed
117. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757,
785 (1994).
118. Harvey Wingo, Growing Disillusionment With the Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw.
L.J. 573, 583 (1971). Illegally seized evidence is largely considered reliable. This
is the case because there are generally two issues that bring the trustworthiness of
evidence into question. Namely, (1) whether it was seized in the place alleged,
and (2) if it somehow connects the defendant to the illegal act. Neither of the an-
swers to these two questions is affected by a violation of the accused's Fourth
Amendment fights. Id.
119. 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (holding that the seizure or compulsory produc-
tion of a man's private papers to be used in evidence against him is equivalent to
compelling him to be a witness against himself and thus prohibited by the Fifth
Amendment).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 633.
122. Id.
123. Amar, supra note 117, at 787-88.
124. The "Lochner era" refers to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905),
where the majority of the Supreme Court justices believed that the freedom that
pervaded American culture must continue to survive. JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD
D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.3 (5th ed. 1995). Thus, in order to fulfill
1912 [Vol. 27:3
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125down a series of holdings sounding in the spirit of Lochner. How-
ever, conspicuously missing from the facts of Boyd's progeny"" was
the government's exercise of its subpoena power to compel self-
incrimination by the defendants. 7 This clearly displayed a willing-
ness by the Court to expand Boyd to further exclude evidence ob-
tained in violation of the Constitution.128
Although there is a sort of superficial appeal to this Lochner-
type philosophy of protecting an individual from the prosecution's
use of his property against him, when considered in more depth,
significant flaws quickly become apparent. First, it is difficult to
understand how this theory can correctly be applied to the exclu-
sion of evidence in the form of contraband and stolen goods since
the defendant never lawfully owned these items.'" Second, when
considering the Court's holding in Schmerber v. California,13 1 it is im-
possible to reconcile how if the seizure of a defendant's blood is
not a form of self-incrimination the admission of his blood stained
shirt can be. 13 In either case, there is simply no overlap between
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.'
The fundamental mistake in Boyd's holding is that the "Fifth
their perceived obligation of protecting laissez faire economic activity, the free-
dom to contract in the marketplace, and the property rights of individuals, these
justices exercised substantive due process, the commerce clause, the contract
clause, and the equal protection clause to strike down as unconstitutional those
laws that they felt interfered with these concepts. Id.
125. Amar, supra note 117, at 788.
126. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1921) (finding that where
the Fourth Amendment is violated by a government official by means of an unlaw-
ful search and seizure of the accused's papers, the use of these documents as evi-
dence against him is a violation of the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-
incrimination); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1920) (holding that unless gained from an independent source, evidence gained
in violation of the commands of the Fourth Amendment shall not be used in any
way); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (reaching the conclusion
that since defendant's papers were taken from his house in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, they should have been returned to him as per his request without
ever being admitted into trial).
127. Amar, supra note 117, at 787-88.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 788.
130. Id.
131. 384 U.S. 757, 761-62 (1966) (holding that since the extraction of the ac-
cused's blood for analysis purposes did not involve either compelled testimony or
evidence of a communicative or testimonial nature, he was not entitled to Fifth
Amendment protection).




Kafka: The Exclusionary Rule: An Alternative Perspective
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
Amendment applies only to 'testimonial' disclosures.""' 4 As Chief
Justice Burger wrote in his famous dissenting opinion in Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, "the Self-
Incrimination Clause [of the Fifth Amendment] does not protect a
person from the seizure of evidence that is incriminating. It pro-
tects a person only from being the conduit by which the police ac-
quire evidence."' 3 AsJustice Holmes compendiously stated in John-
son v. United States,3 6 "[a] party is privileged from producing the
evidence, but not from its production." 
3 7
B. The Fifth Amendment Loses Favor As The Court Turns To The Fourth
Amendment As A Basis For The Exclusion Of Evidence
Although Boyd is credited with starting the conflation of cases
leading to the modem day exclusionary rule, Weeks v. United States
was actually the first case where the exclusion of evidence was based• 138
on the Fourth Amendment alone. The Court explained that:
[t]he effect of the 4th Amendment is to put the courts of
the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of
their power and authority, under limitations and restraints
as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to for-
ever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against all unreasonable searches and seizures un-
der the guise of law .... The tendency of those who exe-
cute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction
by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions ...
should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts
139
134. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 414 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
135. Id.
136. 228 U.S. 457 (1913).
137. Id. at 458. See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221 (1967) (ex-
plaining that requiring the individuals in a lineup to wear strips of tape such as
allegedly worn by the assailant and to utter phrases he allegedly uttered at the
crime scene did not violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910) (holding
that compelling the defendant at trial to put on the blouse worn by the assailant
did not encroach upon his Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-
incrimination). "[T]he prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be
a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compul-
sion to extort communications from him . Id. (emphasis added).
138. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); LAFAVE, supra note 97, at §
1.1(c).
139. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391-92.
1914 [Vol. 27:3
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After the Weeks decision came down, federal officials were
forced to deal with the specter of evidence being excluded whether
they purposefully or inadvertently violated a suspect's Fourth
Amendment rights. 4 0
Thirty-five years later, in Wolf v. Colorado, the Court consid-
ered the issue of whether or not the Weeks exclusionary rule should
apply to the States via Fourth Amendment incorporation into the142 143
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It was in
Wolf that the Court explained that the exclusionary rule did not
have a textual constitutional basis but was instead a creation of the
Court.144 Already in 1949, the Court started to recognize a deter-
rence basis for the exclusion of certain evidence when it noted that
"the exclusion of evidence may be an effective way of deterring un-
reasonable searches." 145  Although the Wolf Court ultimately de-
clined to incorporate the Fourth Amendment into the Fourteenth,
perhaps the case's most vital contribution to the evolution of the
exclusionary rule was its finding that an individual's right of privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by law enforcement is "at the core of the
Fourth Amendment" and "basic to a free society.', 146 The Court
continued that "[i] t is therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered
liberty' 14 and as such is enforceable against the States through the
140. Id. at 393 (declaring that if a person's fundamental right against unrea-
sonable search and seizure is violated, the Fourth Amendment is of no value to
that individual unless the evidence gained by such means is excluded from trial).
141. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
142. U.S. CONST. amend. XLV. "No State shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.
143. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 25-26.
144. Id. at 28 (explaining that Weeks "was not derived from the explicit re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment; it was not based on legislation expressing
Congressional policy in the enforcement of the Constitution. The decision was a
matter ofjudicial implication"). See also United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 45-
46 (1992) (quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983) and noting
that the federal courts may use their "supervisory power[s]" to "formulate proce-
dural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the Congress"); Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976) ("The exclusionary rule was ajudicially created
means of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment."); United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (concluding that "the [exclusionary]
rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
rights").
145. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 31.
146. Id. at 27.
147. The Wolf majority is referring to Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937), where he stated that those immunities
valid as. against the federal government that are "implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty" become valid as against the States via their selective incorporation
20011 1915
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Due Process Clause." 4s
Accordingly, Wolf by no means left open the door to state law
enforcement officers to unlawfully seize evidence by any means
necessary to achieve a conviction. The Court demonstrated its
unwillingness to allow such police misconduct in the infamous case
of Rochin v. California.15 However, instead of using the marriage of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as a basis for excluding the evi-
dence, the Court reasoned that the police conduct "shocks the
conscience" and, therefore, evidence obtained by such means must
be suppressed.15' Although Justices Black and Douglas concurred
in the majority's opinion, they would have suppressed the evidence,
based not on the Court's new "shocks the conscience" test, but
upon "the Fifth Amendment's command that 'No person ... shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self. -,,152
Only two years after Rochin was decided, it became clear in Ir-
vine v. California153 that the "shocks the conscience" test recently de-
veloped by the Court would not be sufficient to protect against all
Fourth Amendment violations by the police. 154 In Irvine, the police
obtained the evidence ultimately used to convict the defendant by
means of a microphone surreptitiously installed in his house.
Through the use of a key made by one of the officers, they were
able to easily and freely enter the abode two additional times to
into the Fourteenth Amendment.
148. Wolf 338 U.S. at 27-28.
149. LAFAVE, supra note 97, at §1.1(d).
150. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). In Rochin, California police officers obtained infor-
mation that the defendant was involved in the illegal sale of narcotics. As the po-
lice entered Rochin's home they witnessed him disposing of evidence by way of
ingestion. In response, officers took him to a hospital and ordered the doctor to
force emetic solution through a tube into the defendant's stomach against his will.
This "stomach pumping" procedure induced vomiting which produced two cap-
sules of morphine that were ultimately used as evidence to secure a conviction. Id.
at 166.
151. Id. at 175.
152. Id. at 174-75 (Black, J., concurring) (quoting Adamson v. People of State
of California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947), as a reason for his belief); Id. at 179
(Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that based on the dictates of the Fifth Amend-
ment, whether the evidence is in the form of words taken from a man's lips, cap-
sules seized from his stomach, or blood extracted from his veins, it is inadmissible
if obtained without his consent).
153. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
154. LAFAVE, supra note 97, at §1.1(d).
155. Irvine, 347 U.S. at 129.
1916 [Vol. 27:3
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move the microphone. 116 Although such conduct seemed to violate
the fundamental principles declared by the Fourth Amendment,
the "shocks the conscience" test proved inadequate because no
matter how obnoxious the police misconduct might have been, it
simply did not "involve coercion, violence or brutality to the per-
son, but rather a trespass to property, plus eavesdropping."151
The demonstrated incapacity of the Rochin test to deal with the
problems of egregious police misconduct is largely considered to
be the reason behind the Supreme Court's decision to overrule
Wolf a mere twelve years after it was decided. In the landmark
case of Mapp v. Ohio,1 59 the Court again had the occasion to con-
sider whether the Fourth Amendment should be applicable to the
States via the Fourteenth Amendment.' 6  Finding alternative
methods of Fourth Amendment protection to be "worthless and fu-
tile"'16' the Court reversed the lower court's decision and reasoned
that:
[s] ince the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been
declared enforceable against the States through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against
them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against
the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as
without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable
federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words,"
valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual char-
ter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that
rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be
so epemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual
nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coerc-
ing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a
freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty .... "
156. Id.
157. Id. at 133.
158. JEROLD H. ISRAEL ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTrrUTION, 41-
42 (1984 & Supp. 1991).
159. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
160. Id. at 645-46. In Mapp, the police forcibly entered defendant's home
without either a search warrant or her permission. In the course of their wide-
spread illegal search they discovered obscene materials which were ultimately used
to secure a conviction in court. The Ohio Supreme Court refused to reverse the
conviction because although "the 'methods' employed to obtain the evidence were
such as to 'offend' a sense ofjustice, ... [it was not] taken from defendant's person
by the use of brutal or offensive physical force." State v. Mapp, 166 N.E.2d 387,
389-90 (1960).
161. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961).
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[T]he admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf
could not consistently tolerate denial of its most impor-
tant constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the
evidence which an accused had been forced to give by
reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to
grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and
enjoyment.
In dicta, the Court reaffirmed that the purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule is to deter.r 3
C. Deterrence As A Basis For Excluding Evidence
Following Mapp v. Ohio, the Court has continued to adhere to
deterrence as the basis for the exclusionary rule.' 64 For example, in
United States v. Calandra, 16 the Supreme Court stated that "the
rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and
thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against
unreasonable searches and seizures."'6 6 In Stone v. Powell, the
Court explained that the predominant theory behind the use of the
exclusionary rule is that it will decrease the frequency of future vio-
lations. 168 The Court reasoned that by removing the incentive to
disregard the Fourth Amendment through the exclusion of evi-
dence, law enforcement officials would thereby be discouraged
from violating a suspect's constitutional rights.6 9 More modern
cases such as Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-
Mendoza,'" and United States v. Leon,"' have echoed this principle.
162. Id. at 655-56.
163. Id. at 656. See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (not-
ing that the exclusionary rule's "purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the con-
stitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive
to disregard it").
164. LAFAvE, supra note 97, at §1.1().
165. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
166. Id. at 347.
167. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
168. Id. at 492. See also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (estab-
lishing that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future police
misconduct).
169. Powell, 428 U.S. at 492.
170. 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (finding that since the INS had already taken
reasonable and sensible steps to deter Fourth Amendment violations by its officers,
any additional deterrent effect brought about by the exclusion of evidence would
be minimal).
171. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). In establishing the "good faith" exception to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, the Court concluded that the
1918 (Vol. 27:3
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The Supreme Court has discussed other purposes for the ex-
clusionary rule. For example, the Court has identified the need to
preserve the imperative of judicial integrity."' In Elkins v. United
States, the majority explained that the courts must not be seen as
accomplices in the willful disobedience of the Constitution. 73 Yet
another purpose for the exclusionary rule recognized by the Court
is the need to assure the public that the courts will not allow the
government to profit from its own illegal behavior.174 The Calandra
court reasoned that the framers of the Constitution fashioned the
exclusionary rule to assure "all potential victims of unlawful gov-
ernment conduct-that the government would not profit from its
lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining
popular trust in government.",
75
Although these other purposes for the exclusionary rule obvi-
ously have some merit, it is the rule's presumed deterrent effect176 177
that has won the day.1
76 Writing for the majority in Stone v. Powell,
Justice Powell reiterated that the primary justification for the exclu-
sionary rule is its deterrent effect on police conduct that violates
the peoples' Fourth Amendment rights. In considering why the
preservation of judicial integrity was not the primary purpose for
the rule, the Powell Court reasoned that:
[1] ogically extended this justification would require that
courts exclude unconstitutionally seized evidence despite
lack of objection by the defendant, or even over his assent
.... Similarly, the interest in promoting judicial integrity
does not prevent the use of illegally seized evidence in
grand jury proceedings. Nor does it require that the trial
court exclude such evidence from use for impeachment of
a defendant, even though its introduction is certain to re-
sult in conviction in some cases. The teaching of these
cases is clear. While courts, of course, must ever be con-
marginal deterrent effect brought about by the exclusion of evidence obtained by
means of an invalid search warrant did not outweigh the substantial societal costs
of excluding such evidence. Id. at 921-22.
172. LAFAVE, supra note 97, at§1.1(f).
173. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) (citing McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943), Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,
said "a conviction resting on evidence secured through such a flagrant disregard
of the procedure which Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to stand
without making the courts themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of law").
174. LAFAVE, supra note 97, at §1.1 (M.
175. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974).
176. LAFAVE, supra note 97, at §1.1 (f).
177. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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cerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial proc-
ess, this concern has limited force as ajustification for the
exclusion of highly probative evidence.
A certain shortcoming of the 'judicial integrity and fairness"
theory becomes apparent by posing and answering two simple
questions. First, do courts in all of those nations that have not
adopted an exclusionary rule (Great Britain) of some sort necessar-
ily lack integrity because, for example, they allow reliable and pro-
bative evidence of criminal guilt?'79 Second, since civil courts of the
United States do not use the rule, are the verdicts somehow defi-
cient?'80 Both of these inquiries must, of course, be answered in the
negative. As stated by Professor Akhil Reed Amar, it is important to
remember that "integrity and fairness are also threatened by ex-
cluding evidence that will help the justice system to reach a true
verdict."'' Regarding the notion that government must not be al-
lowed to profit from its own wrongdoing, Professor Amar correctly
indicates that those criminals who commit the abhorrent crimes
that are often subject to application of the exclusionary rule
182
should not gain a windfall over the people who both expect and




IV. THE NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
With the Court no longer willing to accept Boyd's linkage of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as a reason for excluding reli-
able evidence, and its admission that the rule's true purpose is nei-
ther to preserve judicial integrity nor to assure individuals that the
government will not profit from its wrongful deeds, there is but one
rationale remaining-that of deterrence. However, the fact of the
matter is that there is a lack of data to support this proposition.
84
178. Id. at 485.
179. Amar, supra note 117, at 792.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 792-93.
182. Infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
183. Amar, supra note 117, at 793.
184. Dallin H. Oaks, Studying Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI.
L. REV. 665, 755 (1970) (explaining that there is "hardly any evidence" that the
exclusionary rule exerts any deterrent effects on police behavior); William A.
Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to Exclusionary Rule, 69
GEO. L.J. 1361, 1379 (1981). See also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 449-50
(1976) (noting that although many scholars have attempted to determine whether
the rule indeed does have an exclusionary effect, each study appears to be flawed);
1920 [Vol. 27:3
26
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss3/4
EXCLUSIONARY RULE: STATE V. BRIITON
In fact, what little evidence there is suggests that the exclusionary
rule is actually ineffective as a deterrent. 1 5 Given that there is a
dearth of empirical evidence to support the effectiveness of the ex-
clusionary rule as a deterrent, combined with the fact that "this ef-
fect is not so inherently likely that we can assume it to exist in the
absence of proof," it is difficult to support its continued wholesale
186
use.
A. The Exclusionary Rule: An Ineffective Means Of Deterring Fourth
Amendment Violations by Law Enforcement
A major problem with the deterrence theory is that it is not al-
ways necessary that there be a relationship between the Fourth
Amendment violation and the excluded evidence. 18  Because the
main focus of the exclusionary rule is deterrence, the courts do not
actually consider the person whose rights were violated. s18  Instead,
what they consider when making the determination of whether or
not to exclude evidence is if the deterrent effects that might accrue
from the exclusion outweigh the societal costs that will be incurred
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976) (observing that there is an absence of
empirical data to support the exclusionary rule); Id. at 499 (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring) (emphasizing that "[n] otwithstanding Herculean efforts, no empirical study
has been able to demonstrate that the rule does in fact have any deterrent effect");
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960) (explaining that there are no
empirical statistics available to show a reduced frequency in Fourth Amendment
violations between those states that have adopted the exclusionary rule and those
that admit evidence that has been unlawfully obtained.).
185. Warren E. Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 10-
11 (1964). See also William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance of the Law, 24 U. MICH.
J.L. RErORm 311 (1991). In 1991, Professors Heffernan and Lovely announced the
results of their empirical study where they addressed the issues of law enforce-
ment's knowledge and understanding of the constitutional rules of search and sei-
zure and their willingness to adhere to them. Their analysis consisted of both
questionnaires and interviews administered to officers located in four different
police departments located in New England-and the mid-Atlantic states. They
concluded that the rules of search and seizure are so vague and complex that any
deterrent effect that the exclusionary rule might have is questionable. In addition,
they noted that "it seems unlikely that the fourth amendment rules could be sim-
plified enough to enhance deterrence." Id. at 339. The researchers noted that
"even when officers are extensively trained and also disposed to adhere to the law,
they still will make a substantial number of errors about the legality of intrusions
because they do not know what the law requires of them." Id. at 326-45.
186. Charles Alan Wright, Must a Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50
TEx. L. REv. 736, 741 (1972).
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by not admitting the evidence.18
It is all too clear that the exclusion of relevant and reliable evi-
dence aids the guilty defendant whose constitutional rights protect-
ing against unreasonable search and seizure have been violated.19°
However, what becomes of the innocent victim whose Fourth
Amendment rights have been violated?' 9' There is no redress for
that individual because there is no evidence to exclude when the
wronged party is without guilt. 9' Yet another deficiency with the
deterrence rationale can be found in those cases where a defen-
dant whose rights have been violated agrees to a plea with the
State. 19' In such cases, there is no challenge to the evidence ille-
gally obtained and so the victim suffers with no consequential de-
terrent effect on the officers who illegally obtained the evidence.19
Similarly, if the officers are not committing the misconduct with an
eye toward using evidence at trial, it is unlikely that any kind of de-
terrent effects will be experienced. 95 As Chief Justice Warren la-
conically stated in his Terry opinion:
Regardless of how effective the rule may be where obtain-
ing convictions is an important objective of the police, it is
powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed
rights where the police either have no interest in prose-
cuting or are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the
interest of serving some other goal.
96
It is often the case that police officers consider their most im-
portant function to be that of ferreting out crime, not necessarily to
collect evidence to eventually be used at trial. 197 When confronted
with suspicious circumstances, officers, for a variety of reasons, 98 do
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1379-80.
191. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954) (explaining that the ex-
clusionary rule "protects one against whom incriminating evidence is discovered,
but does nothing to protect innocent persons who are the victims of illegal but
fruitless searches").
192. Oaks, supra note 184, at 736.
193. Schroeder, supra note 184, at 1380; Oaks, supra note 184, at 723.
194. Schroeder, supra note 184, at 1380.
195. Oaks, supra note 184, at 720.
196. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968).
197. JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOuT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DE-
MOCRATIC SOCIETY 220 (1966).
198. Reasons include an officer's concerns that deliberating might allow the
suspect to either escape or give him the opportunity to somehow dispose of the
incriminating evidence. Furthermore, there exists a sense of apprehension that
this failure to act expeditiously will cause embarrassment in front of his superiors
1922 [Vol. 27:3
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not generally feel comfortable taking the time to deliberate about
whether or not the suspect's constitutional rights might be violated
by police action.'" The typical law enforcement official mainly
considers it his duty to apprehend criminals and remove contra-
band from the streets. 20 As a result, it is not always considered cru-
cial that the evidence may not subsequently be admitted at a trial to
occur at a much later date. 0' It is often the case that law enforce-
ment may perform a search and seizure or make an arrest, not nec-
essarily to secure a conviction, but for the primary purpose of dem-
onstrating to the public that something is being done to combat
criminal activity.20  In such cases, "[t]he exclusionary rule can ob-
viously play no role whatsoever ... since no trial is even contem-
plated. The exclusionary rule often fails to deter because it does
not consider the fact that police officers approach their jobs with
204departmental expectations in mind. Because of the fact that offi-
cers are constantly cognizant of the various rewards and sanctions
available to the department in response to their performance, gen-
erally speaking, their primary concern is not the possible exclusion
of illegally seized evidence. Given these alternative motivations, it
is unrealistic to think that the suppression of evidence by way of the
exclusionai' rule will have a significant deterrent effect on law en-
forcement.
A further reason for the dubious effectiveness of the exclu-
sionary rule as a deterrent is the simple fact that the specter of fu-
ture exclusion will not deter officers confronted with the heat-of-





202. Researchers have cited numerous goals and motivations including arrests
for punitive reasons, arrests for the purpose of controlling and relocating vice op-
erations, searches in an effort to establish and maintain the services of informants,
searches for the purpose of removing drugs or weapons from the street, searches
aimed at recovering stolen property, and the closing down of vice operations as an
aid in nuisance abatement procedures. Oaks, supra note 184, at 721-22; LAWRENCE
P. TIFFANY ET AL., DETECTION OF CRIME: STOPPING AND QUESTIONING, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE, ENCOURAGEMENT AND ENTRAPMENT 192-99 (Little, Brown & Co. 1967).
203. Wingo, supra note 118, at 577.
204. John Kaplan, The Limits of ExclusionaTy Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1050
(1974).
205. Id.
206. See generally Burger, supra note 185, at 11.
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search.20' The fact of the matter is that the future exclusion of evi-
dence-sometimes years into the future - is not first and foremost on
the officer's mind when making his decision because "a policeman
is rarely disciplined for action declared illegal by a court as a basis
for suppression." As former Chief Justice Burger once wrote,
"the notion that suppression of evidence in a given case effectively
deters the future action of ... policemen ... was never more than
wishful thinking on the part of the courts."20 9 In his dissenting
opinion in Bivens, Chief Justice Burger wrote that "the history of
the suppression doctrine demonstrates that it is both conceptually
sterile and practically ineffective in accomplishing its stated objec-
tive [of deterrence] . The ChiefJustice opined that a critical rea-
son for this failure is the fact that the offending officers themselves
211are rarely held responsible for their illegal actions. Instead, it is
the prosecutors who must eventually grapple with the Fourth
Amendment violation by virtue of the exclusion of precious evi-
212dence required to secure a conviction. The problem with this is
that prosecutors simply do not have the power or control over the
police to either induce corrective actions or change police proce-
dures. 213 Because virtually no sanctions are brought upon the offi-
cers to effectuate a change in their behavior, the desired effect of
214the rule never truly comes to fruition.
Yet another factor militating against the effectiveness of the
exclusionary rule is the relatively poor communication between the
courts and law enforcement. 215 Without effective communication
between these two parties, it is nearly impossible for the rule to
achieve its desired deterrent effect. 216 As was evident in Britton,
what further exacerbates the problem is the unfortunate tendency




210. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 415 (1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
211. Id. at416.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 417.
214. Id. at 416.
215. Id. at 417 (pointing out that "opinions sometimes lack helpful clarity");
Wingo, supra note 118, at 578 (noting that trial court judges quite frequently fail
to satisfactorily explain their rulings to law enforcement officers). See also Oaks,
supra note 184, at 730-31.
216. Oaks, supra note 184, at 730.
1924 [Vol. 27:3
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the issue of "reasonableness.",1 7 The holdings are often so ambigu-
ous that even judges themselves would be confused with the state ofS • 218
the law regarding arrest and search and seizure. If the sharply di-
vided courts cannot agree on what is and is not "reasonable," it is
difficult to understand how officers faced with the pressures of
making heat-of-the-moment decisions can be expected to clearly
comprehend exactly what is demanded of them.219 As a final word
on the subject of communication, it is worth noting that in those
rare cases where the officer responsible for the illegal search and
seizure is actually notified of the final judicial decision to suppress
the evidence, due to the often lengthy time lapse since the Fourth
Amendment violation, any educational effect that the exclusionary
220
rule might have had is severely minimized.
B. The Exclusionary Rule's Detrimental Effect On Both Society And The
Police
Often, application of the exclusionary rule results in an imme-S 221
diate end to the prosecution. This in turn likely results in the re-
lease of a guilty defendant.22 Precisely for this reason, the rule
"deprives society of its remedy against one lawbreaker because he
has been pursued by another. 2 2  This result has a detrimental ef-
fect on society because it incorrectly forces the courts to refocus
their attention on the police misconduct as opposed to the original
purpose of the trial-the determination of the defendant's guilt or
224
innocence. This deleterious effect is only magnified when the
police violation was merely technical in nature as opposed to an all
217. Wingo, supra note 118, at 577-78.
218. Burger, supra note 185, at 9-10.
219. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 417 (1971).
220. Id.
221. Schroeder, supra note 184, at 1382.
222. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954). See also Schroeder, supra
note 184, at 1384 (observing that excluded evidence is "generally reliable and
probative"); Wingo, supra note 118, at 583 (noting that in the majority of cases,
evidence suppressed by means of the exclusionary rule is actual proof of guilt).
223. Irvine, 347 U.S. at 136. See alsoJOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 2184a, at 31 n.1 (1961) (stating "[o]ur way of upholding the
Constitution is not to strike at the man who breaks it, but to let off somebody else
who broke something else").
224. Oaks, supra note 184, at 755; See Monard G. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule
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225
out invasion of the defendant's substantive rights. Such results
effectively demonstrate to law-abiding individuals that the judicial
226
system allows the guilty to simply go free. In other words, t] he
operation of the Suppression Doctrine unhappily brings to the
public gaze a spectacle repugnant to all decent people-the frustra-• . . ,,227
tion of justice. Such a demonstration has the ruinous effect of
eroding the peoples' respect for both the laws themselves and the
courts that interpret them.2
Even if exclusion of the evidence does not ultimately result in
freedom for the wrongdoing defendant, a court's refocus from the
lawbreaker to the law-enforcer, nevertheless, creates unnecessary
delays in the administration ofjustice. 229 The purpose of a criminal
defendant's trial is not to rule on alleged police misconduct, but to• 230
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Furthermore,
because excluded evidence more often than not is probative of
guilt,2M society is often imperiled by dangerous individuals 2s2 who
are released for long periods pending trial while the court consid-
233
ers procedural issues relating to administration of the rule.
Because the exclusionary rule, rather than having a deterrent
effect on the police, directly affects the prosecutor who represent
the people, it can be fairly asserted that, instead of one of the of-
fending parties, it is actually the people who are punished by the
225. Schroeder, supra note 184, at 1384. In such cases, "the windfall that the
exclusionary rule affords a defendant accused of a serious crime seems totally out
of proportion to the magnitude of the police error." Id.
226. Paulsen, supra note 224, at 256. See also John R. Brown, Good Faith Excep-
tion to the Exclusionary Rule, 23 S. TEx. L.J. 655, 661 (1982) (observing that lay peo-
ple who are unfamiliar with the criminal justice system are often "dismayed and
sometimes disgusted at the spectacle of a criminal being released" by means of
what they view as an acquittal based on a mere technicality); Wingo, supra note
118, at 584.
227. Burger, supra note 185, at 12.
228. Frederick A. Bernardi, The Exclusionary Rule: Is a Good Faith Standard
Needed to Preserve a Liberal Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 30 DEPAUL L. REv.
51, 107 (1980).
229. Wingo, supra note 118, at 583; Oaks, supra note 184, at 742; Paulsen, supra
note 224, at 256-57.
230. See Wingo, supra note 118, at 583-84 (emphasizing that "[t]o allow the
criminal proceedings to be transformed into a court of inquiry concerning the al-
leged police illegality is nothing less than evasion by the courts of their responsibil-
ity in the case").
231. Supra note 222.
232. Infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
233. Schroeder, supra note 184, at 1383.
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suppression of trustworthy evidence.! The mere fact that the peo-
ple believe this to be the case is sufficient in itself to undermine in-
tegrity in the judicial system.135 This exerts a high political price in
that the typical lay person sees the clear frustration of justice
without understanding exactly what the rule is supposed to accom-
236plish.
To compound the problem, the multitude of criminals who go
free because of the exclusionary rule are those who have commit-
ted such hateful crimes as murder, rape, and drug trafficking.3 7
The reason that these types of assailants are- especially rewarded by
the liberal exercise of the rule is that a successful prosecution of
these crimes generally requires the use of physical evidence which
can only be gathered by means of a search and seizure conducted
238by law enforcement officials. Unfortunately, given the large vol-
ume of such cases and resultant pressures on the police, they are
often less careful than far-removed judges would like them to be.9
Not only does operation of the exclusionary rule negatively af-
fect society, it also has a pernicious effect on the attitudes of law en-
forcement. These can be manifested in at least three ways. First,
the suppression of evidence gathered by an officer in good faith
can create a lack of motivation toward performing his duty in the
240future. Second, as the Fifth Circuit pointed out in United States v.
Williams,241 where a police officer conducts a search and seizure in
such a way that he truly believes that.he is not transgressing the
bounds of law, application of the rule does not further the interests
242ofjustice. Instead, it may actually work as a hindrance by forcing
the officer to be so overcautious that he fails to act under circum-
stances where his proper training and reasonable instinct tell him
that the activity he is observing is indeed criminal. 24' Finally, the
suppression doctrine "operate [s] as a demoralizing element in law
enforcement agencies." The police view the courts' exclusion of
trustworthy evidence as an abrupt change in judicial focus from the
234. Wingo, supra note 118, at 576.
235. Schroeder, supra note 184, at 1384.
236. Kaplan, supra note 204, at 1027; Burger, supra note 185, at 12.
237. Wright, supra note 186, at 741; see also Amar, supra note 117, at 793.
238. Wright, supra note 186, at 741.
239. Id.
240. Schroeder, supra note 184, at 1413.
241. 622 F.2d 830 (5" Cir. 1980).
242. Id. at 842.
243. Id.
244. Burger, supra note 185, at 12.
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criminal to the enforcer.145 Such an impression by the typical offi-
cer has the damaging effect of instilling a sense of complete disdain
in the judicial system.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION To THE RULE
The strict application of the exclusionary rule has resulted in
an "inflexible sanction.,,14' This is so because it applies equally re-
gardless of whether the offending officer's unlawful act was the re-
sult of an egregious Fourth Amendment violation or merely due to
a good faith error in judgment.'48 Furthermore, since the courts do
not perform any kind of balancing analysis when applying the rule,
the extent of the crime's brutality and maliciousness is simply im-
material. 249 However, in Tery the Supreme Court made it abun-
dantly clear that "there is 'no ready test for determining reason-
ableness other than by balancing the need to search (or seize)
against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails. ''250 As a
result, it is somewhat perplexing that, when determining whether
or not to suppress a certain piece of evidence, the Court has re-
fused to perform a balancin test which considers the context of
the constitutional 
intrusion.
It makes little sense to continue to interfere with the pursuit of
justice by blindly adhering to a rule that, at a terrible cost to society,
has miserably failed to achieve its purported purpose.15' Although
245. Id.
246. Wingo, supra note 118, at 576.
247. Id. at 584-85.
248. Id. at 585.
249. Id.
250. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968) (quoting Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967), which was decided one year earlier than
Terry).
251. Schroeder, supra note 184, at 1384 (arguing that "assessing the constitu-
tionality of intrusions without regard for the context . . .strains the process of
fourth amendment interpretation").
252. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 847 (5h Cir. 1980). In reversing
the lower court's decision to suppress the evidence, the Fifth Circuit stated:
Where the reason for a rule ceases, the rule should also cease a familiar
maxim carrying special force here. For here the cost of applying the rule
is one paid in coin minted from the very core of our factfinding process,
the cost of holding trials at which the truth is deliberately and knowingly
suppressed and witnesses, in contravention of their oaths, are forbidden
to tell the whole truth and censured if they do. This is a high price in-
deed and one that ought never be paid where, in reason, no deterrence
is called for and none can in fact be had. Such a continued wooden ap-
plication of the rule beyond its proper ambit to situations that its pur-
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researchers have been unable to agree on whether the rule is an ef-
fective deterrent, there is clear recognition of the negative effects
brought about by the continuous and systematic exclusion of reli-
253 254able and trustworthy evidence. Dissenting in Stone v. Powell, Jus-
tice White accurately observed that it is entirely illogical 255 to ex-
clude probative evidence because the defendant's constitutional
256rights were violated . The suppression of evidence that may very
well have been the instrumentality of the crime does absolutely
nothing to recompense the individual whose Fourth Amendment
rights were violated.257 By allowing the guilty to go free, this judi-
cially-imposed sanction effectively deprives the people of their right
to be truly secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects. 58
There is no doubt that constitutional violations by law en-
forcement are a matter of grave concern and need to be addressed.
However, over a century of dismal failures has demonstrated the
imperative need to seriously consider a completely new remedy,
rather than continuing to try and use the exclusionary rule as a
"blunderbuss."
259
As far back as Wolf, decided in 1949, the Court encouraged
260state legislatures to consider alternatives to the exclusionary rule.
poses cannot serve bids fair to destroy the rule entirely in the long run.
Id.
253. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 418 (1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting); Burger, supra note 185, at 15;
Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 185, at 15-18.
254. 428 U.S. 465, 541-42 (1976) (WhiteJ, dissenting).
255. The great evidence scholar, John Henry Wigmore, has described the ex-
clusionary rule as being both "indirect and unnatural." WIGMORE, supra note 223,
at 31 n.1. He described the awkward operation of the rule as follows:
Titus, you have been found guilty of conducting a lottery; Flavius,
you have confessedly violated the Constitution. Titus ought to suffer
imprisonment for crime, and Flavius for contempt. But no! We
shall let you both go free. We shall not punish Flavius directly, but
shall do so by reversing Titus' conviction. This is our way of teaching
people like Flavius to behave, and of teaching people like Titus to
behave, and incidentally of securing respect for the Constitution.
Id. (emphasis in original).
256. Stone, 428 U.S. at 541-42.
257. Id. at 542.
258. Although the Fourth Amendment was, of course, written and ratified to
protect the people against governmental interference, it could be fairly argued that
the courts' strict adherence to the monolith known as the exclusionary rule has
effectively deprived society of its security and freedom by putting patently guilty
offenders back on the street due to purely technical reasons.
259. LAFAvE, supra note 97, at §1.1 (e).
260. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949), aff'g187 P.2d 926 (Colo. 1947),
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It has been almost forty years since Mapp made the rule applicable
to the states via its incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause.16' Despite all of its inherent deficiencies, Min-
nesota has failed to adopt a clear alternative. What makes this even
more frustrating is the fact that there is absolutely no constitutional
basis for the suppression of reliable and trustworthy evidence. 262 If
the Framers had intended for the courts to exercise such incredible
authority, they would have made an explicit declaration in the text
261of the Constitution. In fact, when one considers its history, it be-
comes apparent that the Fourth Amendment assumes a remedy
sounding in tort rather than in criminal law. 26 Therefore, rather
than suppressing probative evidence, we should look to a linkage
between the Fourth and Seventh Amendments 261 when attempting
266
to devise a remedy for an illegal search and seizure.
A. The History Of The Fourth Amendment And CivilJury Trials
The early English cases that gave impetus to the Fourth
Amendment demonstrate how civil damage actions and jury trials
were routinely used to create a system of accountability for those
law enforcement personnel who unreasonably intruded into an in-
dividual's person, property, or privacy. In Wilkes v. Wood,21 the
plaintiff, John Wilkes, brought a trespass action in the Court of
Common Pleas against Robert Wood. Wood, with several of the
King's messengers, entered Wilkes' house and proceeded to search
and seize the contents of several locked containers without taking
an inventory.270 The court framed the issue as whether a Secretary
overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
261. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656-58.
262. E.g., Wingo, supra note 118, at 585-86 (arguing that since the exclusionary
rule rests upon a "shaky foundation," abandoning the rule should by no means be
an insurmountable task).
263. See id. at 585 (observing that "the Supreme Court has overstepped its au-
thority by writing into the fourth amendment a constitutional requirement that is
simply not there").
264. Amar, supra note 117, at 758.
265. The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"[i]n suits at common law ... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United
States, than according to the rules of common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
266. Amar, supra note 117, at 759.
267. Id.
268. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 489, 491.
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of State possesses the legal authority to forcefully enter an individ-
ual's house, break into its contents, and seize the documents from
within upon a bare suspicion of libel by a general warrant without
naming the person charged.2 7' The jury answered this question in
the negative and awarded Wilkes damages in the amount of 1,000
pounds.2 72 The court explained that a jury has the power to give
punitive damages as a means of deterring such illegal conduct in
the future and as proof of their detestation for the lawless invasion
273of the plaintiffs rights. In his final instruction to the jury, the
Lord Chief Justice instructed them that "if [they] found Mr. Wilkes
the author or publisher of [the libelous material], it will be filed,
and stand upon record in the Court of Common Pleas, and of course
be produced as proof upon the criminal cause."
2 74
Wilkes was, of course, not the only major decision of the time
which served as proof that the English courts never envisioned the
wholesale exclusion of evidence gathered by illegal means, but in-
stead a civil remedy meant to deter such unlawful conduct. In the
same year Wilkes was decided, the Court of Common Pleas heard
275Huckle v. Money, which again involved an action in trespass over a
search and seizure of the plaintiff's house by means of a general
276warrant. In the final part of the court's holding, the Lord Chief
Justice concluded that the jury was within its right to award exem-
plary damages and noted that "it is very dangerous for the Judges to
intermeddle in damages for torts." 27 7 A year later, in 1764, the Court
of Common Pleas decided Beardmore v. Carrington.278 Here, the is-
sue was whether the jury's award of 10,001 pounds to the plaintiff
as damages for trespass and false imprisonment occasioned upon
an illegal general warrant was excessive thereby requiring a new
279trial. In a per curiam decision, the court held that the damages
were not excessive because such an exercise of tortious behavior by
state officials tramples upon the liberty of every one of the King's
280subjects and cannot be condoned.
271. Id. at 490.
272. Id. at 499.
273. Id. at 498-99.
274. Id. at 499 (emphasis added).
275. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763).
276. Id. at 768.
277. Id. at 769 (emphasis added).
278. 95 Eng. Rep. 790 (C.P. 1764).
279. Id. at 791.
280. Id. at 794. See also Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 811 (C.P. 1765)
(instructing the jurors that if they were to find that the accused government offi-
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Colonists in the New World also enthusiastically embraced the
role of the jury in awarding monetary damages for illegal searches
and seizures by government officials."' For example, in a PENNSYL-
VANIA HERALD article dated October 17, 1787, an anonymous De-
mocratic Federalist282 colorfully articulated the necessity for a trial
by jury with the following pointed discussion:
Suppose ... that a constable, having a warrant to search
for stolen goods, pulled down the clothes of a bed in
which there was a woman, and searched under her shift,-
suppose, I say, that they commit similar, or greater indig-
nities, in such cases a trial by jury would be our safest re-
source, heavy damages would at once punish the offender, and
deter others from committing the same ....
Similar sentiments were echoed by A Maryland Farmer 2 4 in his
essay appearing in the February 15, 1788, issue of the MARYLAND
GAZETTE, where he passionately exclaimed that "no remedy has
been yet found equal to the task of detering [sic] and curbing the
insolence of office, but a jury .... 2'5 That same year, an essay ap-
peared in the January 26, 1788, issue of the MASSACHUSETTS
CENTINEL where Hampden emphatically warned that without a trial
by jury in civil actions, "no relief can be had against the High Offi-
cers of State, for abuse of private citizens.",2 6 In addition, the prolix
yet profound Luther Martin vehemently argued for civil jury trials
2871as a remedy for search and seizure cases. In his GENUINE INFOR-
MATION, delivered to the legislature of the State of Maryland rela-
tive to the proceedings of the Philadelphia General Convention of
1788, Martin emphasized the importance of juries to protect
cials were guilty of the said trespass, then they should award the plaintiff civil dam-
ages).
281. Amar, supra note 117, at 776.
282. Although it is not entirely certain, it is probable that the author was Rich-
ard Henry Lee. See ESSAY OF A DEMOCRATIC FEDERALIST (1787), reprinted in 3 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 58, 58 (HerbertJ. Storing ed., 1981).
283. Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
284. While there is no definitive proof of his identity, it is widely believed that
A Maryland Farmer was actually the active Maryland Anti-Federalist, John Frances
Mercer. ESSAYS BY A FARMER (1788), reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 5,
5 (HerbertJ. Storing ed., 1981).
285. Id. at 5, 14.
286. ESSAYS BY HAMPDEN (1788), reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
198, 200 (HerbertJ. Storing ed., 1981).
287. LUTHER MARTIN, THE GENUINE INFORMATION DELIVERED TO THE LEGISLA-
TURE OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 27,
70-71 (HerbertJ. Storing ed., 1981).
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against "every arbitrary act of the general government, and every
oppression of all those variety of officers appointed under its au-
thority."
2 88
This respect for the civil jury system as a means to both redress
and deter what we now term "Fourth Amendment violations" car-
ried into American appellate court decisions well into the nine-
289teenth century. In United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, the Massachu-
setts Circuit Court had occasion to consider the legality of a search
and seizure of a sailing vessel alleged to be involved in the slave
trade. 290 In making that determination, the court noted that if the
capture of the ship was ultimately determined to be unlawful, then
the State would be liable for both damages and costs.2' Justice
Story expounded that if the seized property turns out not to be
possessed by unlawful means, then "the seizor is a trespasser ab ini-
tio, and liable, as such, to damages. In addition, the court de-
clined to accept the suppression doctrine in cases of illegally seized
evidence. Justice Story stated in laconic fashion:
In the ordinary administration of municipal law the right
of using evidence does not depend, nor, as far as I have
any recollection, has ever been supposed to depend upon
the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the mode, by which it is
obtained. If it is competent or pertinent evidence, and
not in its own nature objectionable, as having been cre-
ated by constraint, or oppression, ... the evidence is ad-
missible, ... even though it may have been obtained by a
trespass upon the person, or by any other forcible or ille-
gal means. The law deliberates not on the mode, by
which it has come to possession of the party, but on its
value in establishing itself as satisfactory proof.
In 1841, nineteen years after La Jeune Eugenie had been de-
cided, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts decided Commonwealth
v. Dana294 where it reaffirmed that it would reject the exclusion of
reliable and probative evidence gathered in violation of an individ-
ual's Fourth Amendment rights. The court explained that such a
288. Id.
289. 26 F. Cas. 832 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551).
290. Id. at 840.
291. Id. at 843.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 843-44.
294. 43 Mass. (1 Met.) 329 (1841).
295. Id. at 337.
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violation is remedied, not by suppressing pertinent evidence, but by
296making the responsible party liable for his actions. Writing for
the court, Justice Wilde made clear that " [w] hen papers are offered
in evidence, the court can take no notice how they were obtained,
whether lawfully or unlawfully.
2 97
B. The Tort Remedy Alternative
History clearly demonstrates that the Fourth Amendment was
drafted so as to provide for the award of monetary damages in
those situations where overzealous government officials violated its
commands. s Furthermore, its guarantee that the people shall be
"secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects 29Pis reminis-
cent of those common law tort principles established to protect the
peoples' personhood, property, and privacy.0 Therefore, it would
be entirely appropriate for Minnesota to institute a tort remedy
that would serve as a complete alternative to the irrational and inef-
fective exclusionary rule. In other words, if the evidence is reliable
and trustworthy, it shall be admitted. Such a remedy would provide
the level of deterrence that the courts had always hoped for from
the failed suppression doctrine regardless of whether or not the in-
jured party was prosecuted."'
A tort remedy would afford the possibility for redress against
either the offending law enforcement officer or the police depart-
ment itself.30 However, for a number of reasons, the latter would
303seem to be the superior alternative to adopt. First, if the ag-
grieved party were to prevail in his civil damage action against the
officer, given the nominal asset base of the average law enforce-
ment official, the collectable amount would more than likely be
minimal. 04 Second, given the wide zones of individual officer im-
munity that the courts have created through the years, holding a
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Amar, supra note 117, at 777.
299. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
300. Amar, supra note 117, at 781.
301. Oaks, supra note 184, at 757.
302. See, e.g., Wingo, supra note 118, at 579-82 (offering several alternatives to
the exclusionary rule including, but not limited to, the right to bring a civil dam-
age action against the wrongdoing police officer, or the ability to file a strict entity
liability claim against the government itself).
303. Amar, supra note 117, at 812.
304. Wingo, supra note 118, at 579-80.
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police officer strictly liable for violating an individual's constitu-
tional rights would be an insuperable task indeed.0 5 Finally, insti-
tuting a strict entity liability scheme for Fourth Amendment viola-
tions would instill an increased sense of awareness in the minds of
both the taxpayers compelled to take on the escalating financial
burden and the legislators forced into the predicament of having
to explain the state of affairs. 6
Proponents of the suppression doctrine often cite to the ne-
cessity of preventing invidious discrimination by law enforcement
as a reason for invoking the exclusionary rule.3 7 However, as Jus-
tice Scalia stated in his opinion for a unanimous court in Whren v.
United States,30 8 "the constitutional basis for objecting to intention-
ally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection
Clause, 3°9 not the Fourth Amendment."3 1 0 Therefore, it would be
entirely appropriate for Congress to put the failed exclusionary
rule to rest and in its place adopt an administrative or quasi-judicial
remedy to provide restitution for those victims whose Fourth
Amendment rights were violated by the police.311  By making the
government liable for damages caused by its law enforcement per-
sonnel via the doctrine of respondeat superior, the aggrieved party
would be justly compensated for the invasion of his constitutional
rights without the resulting harm that would otherwise inure to so-
ciety by allowing a truly guilty peretrator to go free by excluding
reliable and trustworthy evidence. 2 In addition, unlike the exclu-
sionary rule which is thoroughly ineffective at redressing the inno-
cent victim, a civil damage remedy would fairly provide restitution to
all, irrespective of guilt.
3'
Although of vital importance, compensation should not be the
government's only goal.C4 Police deterrence should also be the
305. Amar, supra note 117, at 812.
306. Id. at 813; Wingo, supra note 118, at 581-82.
307. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
308. Id.
309. "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
310. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
311. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 422 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
312. Wingo, supra note 118, at 581.
313. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 422 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Wingo, supra note 118,
at 582. See also Amar, supra note 117, at 797 (explaining that with the exclusionary
rule, the guiltier a defendant is, the more he benefits).
314. Wingo, supra note 118, at 582.
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necessary focus of any new scheme that the legislature adopts to
replace the exclusionary rule.1 A civil damage action will have this
desired deterrent effect if a record of the wrongful officer's con-t-1316
duct is inserted into his or her personnel file. By taking such ac-
tion, the department will then have the opportunity to institute dis-
ciplinary action and provide for the further training necessary to
311prevent future Fourth Amendment violations.
In his dissenting opinion in Bivens, Chief Justice Burger laid
out a simple but effective statutory scheme that could effectivelyS • 3 1 8
serve as a substitute to the suppression doctrine. His was essen-
tially a five-pronged model that provided for: 1) a waiver of sover-
eign immunity as to the illegal acts of law enforcement personnel;
2) the creation of a cause of action for those individuals whose con-
stitutional rights were violated by government agents; 3) the crea-
tion of a quasi-judicial tribunal responsible for adjudicating claims
raised under the statute; 4) a provision directing that a civil damage
remedy is completely in lieu of the exclusion of evidence obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and 5) a provision com-
manding the courts not to exclude any evidence that would other-
wise be admissible but for a Fourth Amendment violation.319 This
statutory scheme which provides for government entity liability
could be fashioned so as to resemble a U.S.C. 42 Section 1983.. 320
cause of action. Because the legislation's success depends en-
tirely upon the Supreme Court's willingness to uphold its constitu-
tionality, it is imperative that the Court embrace the statute as a
move toward fairness to not only all victims of Fourth Amendment
violations, but also society as a whole. Once the Court establishes
the constitutional validity, then Minnesota and other states can
move toward the development of its own remedial system modeled
315. Id.
316. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 423 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
317. Id. at 422.
318. Id. at 422-23.
319. Id.
320. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum-
bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion on any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1994).
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321
after that of the federal government.
In Brown v. Bryan County, 22 decided in the second half of last
year, the Fifth Circuit held that where a police officer uses excessive
force in an arrest and causes injury, a municipality can be sued for
its "failure to provide proper training" under section 1983.323 Given
a victim has the right to sue a municipality for such a violation of
his civil rights, it logically follows that an individual faced with an
unlawful search and seizure by law enforcement officials, whether
they be federal, state, or local, should be afforded the same oppor-
tunity to file for civil damages. Therefore, not only does it make
perfect sense for the legislature to pass a statute that strictly de-
mands a civil remedy for Fourth Amendment violations by law en-
forcement officials, it also would be entirely prudent for the Court
to find such a law constitutional and in the best interest of the pub-
lic.
A familiar criticism of a civil damage remedy is that unless a
plaintiff is able to show "real ill will or malice" on the part of the
defendant, he will never collect.324 However, animus behavior on
the part of the police officer need not be an element of the statu-
tory scheme. All that would be necessary in order to collect is that
there be a violation of a person's Fourth Amendment guarantee
325against an illegal search and seizure. In addition, in order to
avoid a watering down of the statute's effectiveness, the tribunal
should consider neither the reasonableness of the law enforcement
326
official's conduct, nor the defendant's bad reputation. After the
tribunal has found a Fourth Amendment violation, it would use a
sliding scale devised by members of the judiciary and legislative
branches that bases damage awards on the severity of the violation.
Such a flat fee award structure could be roughly modeled after
Minnesota's sentencing guidelines scheme. Finally, judges would
be instructed to consider the offending officer's bad faith conduct
and number of previous violations as aggravating factors requiring
an upward adjustment in the damage award. Adopting such guide-
lines would help remove much of the subjectivity that might ordi-
321. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 423-24 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
322. 219 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 2000).
323. Id. at 457.
324. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 43 (1949) (MurphyJ., dissenting).
325. Amar, supra note 117, at 813 (arguing that "[i]f the search and seizure is
ultimately deemed unreasonable, the government entity should pay").
326. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 43 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (complaining that the use of
such factors defeat the injured party's ability to recover).
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narily be present when a truly guilty victim alleges a Fourth
Amendment violation, thus allowing him to collect more than just
nominal damages.1
2 7
In addition to compensatory damages, punitive damages
would also be available just as they were in 1763 when the Court of
Common Pleas decided Wilkes. As Lord Chief Justice Pratt so elo-
quently stated over 230 years ago:
a jury have it in their power to give damages for more
than the injury received. Damages are designed not only
as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as pun-
ishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding
for the future, and as proof of the detestation of the jury
to the action itself.
28
It need not be necessary for the plaintiff to prove actual harm
in order for the court to award exemplary damages against the gov-329
ernment. Because "deterrence requires that the defendant must• .,,330
pay more than the plaintiff suffered, all that would be necessary
is ajury finding of a constitutional violation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Officer Taylor and his partner did not violate Britton's Fourth
Amendment rights when they stopped him to investigate the bro-
ken window. 33' They were well within the scope of their duties and,
in fact, would have been derelict if they would have failed to take
the actions necessary to either confirm or refute their reasonable
suspicions. 32 As the Minnesota Supreme Court succinctly stated
the same year Terry was decided, "persons found under suspicious
circumstances are not clothed with a right of privacy which pre-
vents law-enforcement officers from inquiring as to their identity
and actions. The essential needs of public safety permit police offi-
cers to use their faculties of observation and to act thereon within
proper limits."
333
327. Wingo, supra note 118, at 579 (noting that critics of a civil action remedy
argue that only nominal damages are awarded when a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion is actually proved).
328. Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498-99 (C.P. 1763).
329. Wolf 338 U.S. at 43 (MurphyJ., dissenting).
330. Amar, supra note 117, at 815-16.
331. State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 86 (Minn. 2000).
332. State v. Fish, 280 Minn. 163, 169, 159 N.W.2d 786, 791 (1968).
333. Id. at 167, 159 N.W.2d at 789 (citing State v. Clifford, 273 Minn. 249, 141
N.W.2d 124 (1966); State v. Sorenson, 270 Minn. 186, 134 N.W.2d 115 (1965);
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Terry is based on a common sense approach that allows law en-
forcement officials to consider the entire situation and inquire asS .•334
to whether or not a given act is criminal. As Professor Daniel
Richman observed in his analysis of the Terry holding, "[t]here is
such a thing as a real 'hunch,' and ... retrospective judicial inquir-
ies into an officer's conduct may not be able to capture the full ex-
tent of this justification. ,3 The evidence concerning the intoxi-
cated nature of Britton that was obtained as a result of the stop
should have been admitted. Law enforcement officials must be al-
lowed the opportunity to utilize their training and experience to
protect the health, safety, and welfare of the communities they
serve.336 To achieve this goal, it is necessary that the courts afford
considerable deference to the professional decisions that these po-
lice officers are forced to make often with little time for delibera-
tion.337
As long as the courts continue to adhere to the exclusionary
rule and refuse to admit evidence vital to a successful prosecution,
it will be difficult for the people to truly feel secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects. In an effort to protect this secu-
rity, the government's interest in the use of veracious and reliable
evidence must surely outweigh the minimal intrusion brought
about by a brief official police stop. This is not to trivialize the in-
vidious nature of constitutional violations by those individuals we
entrust to protect us. However, for such abominations we must
look to civil damages, not the exclusion of reliable and trustworthy
evidence. A remedial scheme based on strictly monetary awards
would have a twofold effect. First, it would allow all victims of
Fourth Amendment violations to be compensated, even those who
are innocent. Second, unlike under the exclusionary rule, society
would no longer be compelled to suffer as a result of the judicial
system allowing a "criminal ... to go free because the constable has
blundered."
338
State ex rel. Branchaud v. Hedman, 269 Minn. 375, 130 N.W.2d 628 (1964)).
334. Saltzburg, supra note 90, at 952.
335. Richman, supra note 50, at 1050 (emphasis added).
336. Id. at 1047.
337. Id.
338. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
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